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Abstract 
Two experiments tested the effects of self-distancing and mindfulness instructions on approach 
motivation and state anxiety. Following Kross and Ayduk (2011), we expected that the self-
distancing and mindfulness instructions would be particularly useful in providing relief for 
anxious people who tend to get mired in ruminative distress. Both experiments accordingly 
tested the hypotheses that self-distancing and mindfulness manipulations should restore a more 
buoyant approach motivated state and reduce anxious distress, especially among the more trait 
anxious participants. Results with both fly-on-the-wall (Study 1, N = 148) and mindfulness 
(Study 2, N = 143) manipulations revealed that both manipulations increased self-reported 
approach motivation only for trait anxious participants. Neither self-distancing nor mindfulness 
had an effect on self-reported anxious distress and negative affect. The discussion examines 
whether the self-distancing and mindfulness manipulations increased approach motivation 
among trait anxious participants due a defensive reactive approach motivation (McGregor, Nash, 
Mann, & Phills, 2010), or if they restored a resilient kind of approach motivation which then 
allowed trait anxious participants to more mindfully acknowledge their worries. The discussion 
also examines possible reasons why the self-distancing and mindfulness manipulations did not 
reduce state anxiety despite their demonstrated effectiveness in past studies (Kross & Ayduk, 
2011; Baer, 2003; Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010).  
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I. Introduction 
Anxiety and depression are among the most common mental health problems. Eighteen percent 
of the population is distressed by either of these conditions at any one time (Wittchen, Nelson, & 
Lachner, 1998). Furthermore, people perceive even moderate episodes of anxiety and depression 
as impeding their quality of life (Kendall & Brady, 1995). Given the distressing nature of these 
conditions, people struggling with depression and anxiety want to improve their psychological 
condition. Current struggles with anxiety and depression predict later psychopathology (e.g. 
Ollendick & King, 1998), however, which suggests that adequate solutions are elusive. Research 
has therefore focused on therapeutic techniques that might help.  
 Many therapy methods try to help depressed and anxious individuals by helping them engage in 
more meaningful goals. Pursuing personal goals is related to well-being, such as overall life 
satisfaction and increased positive affect (Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001), and simply striving 
to attain personal goals, regardless of achievement, is thought to increase overall well-being 
(Sheldon, Kasser, Smith, & Share, 2002).   
However, both anxiety and depression have been shown to negatively affect goal motivation. 
Anxiety and depression are related to increased avoidance motivation (i.e. the avoidance of 
undesirable outcomes) and to decreased approach motivation (i.e. the pursuit of desirable 
outcomes; Dickson & MacLeod, 2004a). This is troublesome because increased avoidance 
motivation and decreased approach motivation are thought to result in less well-being, possibly 
due to increased attention towards potential goal failures rather than what can be successfully 
accomplished (Elliot, Sheldon, & Church,  1997).  
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These findings parallel Gray and McNaughton’s (1982) motivation model which is composed of 
the behavioural activation system (BAS) and the behavioural inhibition system (BIS). The BIS 
serves to regulate behavior towards punishment and aversive experiences (i.e. avoidance 
motivation). The BAS, on the other hand, is thought to be responsible for behavior towards 
reward and desirable experiences (i.e. approach motivation).  
The Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) and the Behavioural Activation System (BAS) 
According to Gray and McNaughton (1982), humans and related animals become anxious when 
their goals are threatened by uncertainty and/or punishment. This feeling of anxiety is termed 
“anxious uncertainty”, and it is the starting point of the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), a 
neural system which has evolved in vertebrates to deal with goal conflict. When a goal is 
threatened, the BIS arouses a vigilant state of anxious uncertainty in order to motivate the animal 
to search for an alternative means of attaining the blocked goal, or to search for newer and more 
feasible goals (Nash, McGregor, & Prentice, 2011). 
Approaching a new goal re-enables approach motivation, a single-minded state of goal pursuit. 
When approach motivated, stimuli not related to the goal are less noticeable and less distracting 
(Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002). Therefore, minor goal 
hindrances and different mindsets are shielded while one’s own are dominate (Guinote, 2007; 
Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). This allows the animal to pursue the new goal with a 
focused mindset.   
Furthermore, approach motivation reduces activity of the BIS (e.g. anxious uncertainty). The 
anxiety reducing quality of approach motivation is supported by two main findings. First, neural 
activity correlated with approach motivation has generally been demonstrated to reduce both 
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neural and behavioral reactions to anxiety activating events (Nash et al., 2011). Second, it has 
been argued by some that approach motivation limits attention to information related to the new 
goal and prevents other information from distracting the organism (Harmon-Jones & Gable, 
2009). This suggests that anxiety related cognitions regarding a blocked goal can  also be tuned 
out in order to help the animal focus on the new goal.  
The Benefits of Approach Motivation 
Approach motivation’s ability to attenuate the anxious uncertainty of the BIS is considered a 
means of encouraging organisms to find new goals in the face of conflict. In other words, when a 
goal is conflicted, the animal will be motivated to pursue a new goal in order to activate 
approach motivation and reduce anxious uncertainty. As can be imagined, this is useful when an 
organism needs to withdraw from uncertain goals in order to seek more feasible goals. 
Trait and state approach motivation are associated with a host of benefits. In fact, research has 
found strong associations between neural markers of approach motivation (i.e. greater left 
compared to right frontal brain activity; Elliot & Fryer, 2008) and lessened reactivity to 
threatening stimuli, increased mental health (Elliot & Fryer, 2008), greater happiness and 
meaning in life (Urry, 2009), as well as less reactivity to precarious and noxious stimuli 
(Gianotti, et al., 2009). Furthermore, when biofeedback is used to increase approach motivated 
neural activity, there is greater inhibition of goal conflicts (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Fearn, 
Sigelman, & Johnson, 2008). Nash, McGregor and Inzlicht (2010) have also demonstrated that 
approach-motivated EEG activity is associated with less distressful reactivity in the ACC during 
Stroop-task errors. Lastly, neural markers of approach motivation (i.e. greater left compared to 
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right frontal brain activity) are indicative of the active and uplifting moods theoretically 
associated with approach motivation (Drake & Myers, 2006).  
Overall, approach motivation’s characteristic ability to single-mindedly focus on a new goal can 
be very useful when it is necessary to move from conflicted to non-conflicted goals. Given that 
approach motivation is such a functional mechanism, it is important to understand why chronic 
or dysfunctional anxiety and depression might lead to impaired approach motivation and 
increased avoidance motivation.  
The Relation Between BIS/BAS, and Anxiety and Depression 
Researchers previously speculated that both depression and anxiety would be related to higher 
levels of BIS, while only depression would be related to lower levels of BAS (Fowles, 1987). 
However the relationship between anxiety and depression, and BIS-BAS has been found to be 
more nuanced than expected.  
Recent research has shown that depression is in fact associated with decreased approach 
motivation (Dickson & MacLeod, 2004ab), however the reasons for this relation are still unclear. 
Depression’s characteristic focus on past failures may make a person more sensitive to present 
cues of failure, which may subsequently inhibit approach motivated goals in order to protect 
against failure. This is problematic because a lack of approach motivated goals will result in less 
experience with reward and desirable outcomes, which may further increase depression’s 
association with past failures (Beck 1979). Reduced approach motivation among depressed 
people may also be a function of depression’s characteristic hopelessness (Beck, 1979). In other 
words, less anticipation for positive outcomes may result in a lower desire to pursue approach 
motivated goals.  
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Depression’s association with avoidance motivation, on the other hand, is more nuanced. 
Specifically, depression has been related to increased avoidance related plans, but not to 
avoidance related goals. According to McIntosh (1996), plans are the more detailed aspects of 
goal attainment and consist of how everyday actions can be directed towards a goal (also see 
Dickson and MacLeod, 2004a for a more in depth differentiation between goals and plans). 
Therefore, although depression may not be associated with increase avoidance related goals, 
depressed individuals are thought to pursue more avoidance related plans in order to accomplish 
their goals (Dickson & MacLeod, 2004a). 
As expected, recent research has shown that anxiety is in fact associated with increased 
avoidance motivation. The idea of anxiety resulting in greater avoidance related goals is 
consistent with research showing that anxiety increases attention towards threatening cues. This 
attention bias may prolong the vigilance and expectation of threatening experiences associated 
with the BIS, which may subsequently prolong long-term levels of anxiety (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1994).  
Many studies have found anxiety not to be associated with approach motivation, which might 
suggest that anxiety does not affect one’s desire to approach desirable outcomes. However, 
Dickson and MacLeod (2004a) have found a more nuanced relationship between anxiety and 
approach motivation. Specifically, anxiety has been found to be related to decreased approach 
motivated plans, but not to approach motivated goals (Dickson & MacLeod, 2004ab). The 
relation between anxiety and approach motivation might also be obscured by the tendency for at 
least some people to react to threat and anxiety with defensive forms of BAS activity. Reacting 
to a threat with approach motivation in order to quell the anxiety is referred to as reactive 
approach motivation (RAM). RAM can take on defensive forms which can be unproductive but 
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anxiety reducing nonetheless (McGregor, Nash, Mann, & Phills, 2010). Depression, on the other 
hand, does not activate RAM (McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2013; McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 
2009).  
Overall, anxiety and depression seem to be capable of decreasing approach motivation and 
increasing avoidance motivation. This similar effect is not surprising given how anxiety and 
depression share so many facets and are so highly correlated with each other, especially at the 
less extreme (i.e. sub-clinical) levels. Ideally, treatment techniques for anxiety and depression 
will not only reduce state anxiety, but will also allow people to pursue goals (i.e. increase 
approach motivation). Mindfulness and self-distancing are two therapeutic techniques which 
may be capable of doing this.  
Self-Distancing, Mindfulness, and Approach-Avoidance Motivation 
Approach motivation is a necessary function that helps humans find solutions to conflicted goals, 
and it is associated with a host of benefits such as reduced anxiety. Therefore, aside from 
reducing state anxiety, helpful therapeutic techniques may also be able to increase approach 
motivation in order to help individuals re-engage in goals rather than being bogged down in 
ruminative distress. 
Mindfulness and self-distancing are two therapeutic techniques that allow people to observe their 
anxiety related cognitions as they occur. They are means of developing a deeper awareness and a 
newer understanding of anxiety related cognitions. Zgierska et al. (2009) define mindfulness as 
"the intentional, accepting and non-judgmental focus of one's attention on the emotions, thoughts 
and sensations occurring in the present moment." Kross and Ayduk (2011) define self-distancing 
as when people “take a step back when thinking about…experiences and reason about them from 
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the perspective of a distanced observer, akin to a fly on the wall.” Self-distancing and 
mindfulness are conceptually similar practices which share the common objective of increasing 
one’s awareness and understanding of his/her anxiety(or non-anxiety) related cognitions. Both 
have been related to therapeutic techniques such as decentering (Sauer & Baer, 2010), and both 
are considered foundational aspects of therapy programs such as Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy and Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (Baer, 2005; Ayduk & Kross, 2010). 
Self-distancing and mindfulness have already been found to reduce short-term and long-term 
affective and physical distress (Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Baer, 2003). Furthermore, the accepting 
and non-judgmental nature of mindfulness and self-distancing is thought to help people 
reconstrue and reduce  their anxiety (Kross & Ayduk, 2011; Siegel, 2007; Hayes, 2006). 
Therefore, given that self-distancing and mindfulness can improve mood and help reduce 
anxious distress, both of which are also associated with increased approach motivation, we 
speculated that that these two techniques would give people an opportunity to emerge from the 
ruminative BIS state and become more approach motivated.  
Self-Distancing 
People are interested in understanding their behaviours and feelings (Kelly, 1967), and this 
desire to understand one’s feelings is particularly strong during distress because people believe 
understanding their cognitions will help alleviate distress (Wilson & Gilbert, 2008). But this is 
not necessarily true. In fact, although there is research showing that an awareness of one’s 
reaction to distress enables greater adaptation as well as greater psychological and physical well-
being (Wilson & Gilbert, 2008), there is also a great deal of research demonstrating that attempts 
to understand emotions can result in rumination. This makes sense given that rumination is 
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essentially a process whereby people are chronically thinking of their emotions and why they 
feel that way, and this over involved thinking has been shown to actually worsen negative 
emotions (Smith & Alloy, 2009). 
Psychological distance can generally be described as when one’s direct and egocentric 
experience of a stimulus is diminished (Liberman & Trope, 2008). The concept of self-distancing 
has figured prominently in the literature on self-control and adaptive coping. Social 
psychologists have demonstrated that children who are able to engage in self-distancing are able 
to delay short-term desirable outcomes in order attain more long-term goals (Mischel & Ayduk, 
2004; Mischel & Rodriguez, 1993). On the same line, newer work suggests psychological 
distance as manipulated in a number of dimensions, such as spatially (manipulating distance), 
temporally (manipulating time) and socially (self vs. other), leads to an awareness of the greater 
context for an event, which subsequently helps the person focus more on long-term goals rather 
than being seduced by short-term goals (Liberman & Trope, 2008). Psychological distancing has 
also been shown to result in more positive self-construals and greater achievement motivation 
(Libby, Eibach & Gilovich, 2005; Vasquez & Buehler, 2007). 
Self-distancing has also received a lot of attention in clinical research. Alford and Beck (1998) 
explained that “distancing refers to the ability to view one’s own thoughts (or beliefs) as 
constructions of ‘reality’ rather than as reality itself.” Being able to self-distance was considered 
necessary for cognitive therapy. Similarly, many of the newer types of cognitive behavioural 
therapy, such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy, 
and Dialectical Behaviour Therapy, emphasize “decentering” as being necessary for therapy. 
Decentering is very similar to self-distancing because it essentially teaches patients to “step back 
from their thoughts and feelings and observe them” (Ayduk & Kross, 2010).  
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Self-Distancing and Analyzing Negative Emotions 
Kross and Ayduk (2008) predicted that the utility of analyzing emotions from negative 
experiences would depend on the level of psychological distance. Confirming their prediction, 
they found that analyzing negative experiences with low psychological distance (i.e. self-
immersion) led to rumination, whereas high psychological distance (i.e. self-distancing) led to 
adaptive self-reflection and less physiological and emotional reactivity, both in the short-term 
and the long-term (Kross & Ayduk, 2008).  
Self-distancing is also thought to allow people to reconstrue the meaning of their negative 
experiences rather than simply ruminate about what happened. Kross and Ayduk (2008) 
demonstrated that a self-distanced (vs. self-immersed) perspective when recalling negative 
experiences (specifically anger and sadness related experiences) results in less rumination over 
the emotionally distressing details of the event, and more reconstruing of the negative 
experiences in ways that seemed to demonstrate more insight and emotional closure.   
Mindfulness 
Mindfulness, which has its roots in the Buddhist wisdom traditions, has also been the subject of 
much psychological research assessing the effectiveness of mindfulness based clinical programs, 
such as the Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) program (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) and the 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy program (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). 
This research has attempted to demonstrate that mindfulness based interventions can be an 
effective means of reducing problematic psychological symptoms such as excessive anxiety and 
depression (Bishop, 2002; Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004).  
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The seemingly impressive results of mindfulness based interventions among both clinical and 
non-clinical populations has led to mindfulness becoming a foundational element of many 
interventions designed to treat psychological disorders such as BPD (Linehan, 1993; Linehan, 
Heard, & Armstrong, 1993), depression (Ma & Teasdale, 2004; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 
2002) and anxiety (Kabat-Zinn, 1992; Miller, Fletcher, & Kabat-Zinn, 1995). The results have 
been equally encouraging for non-clinical populations. Brown and Ryan (2003) found lower 
levels of unpleasant affect in high trait mindfulness people, and studies have found that 
mindfulness interventions (on average lasting about 8 weeks) can result in lower levels of state 
and trait anxiety, as well as less perceived stress in response to problems as compared to 
waitlisted control groups (Shapiro, Schwartz, & Bonner, 1998).  
Despite all of this clinical evidence, there is still confusion regarding the mechanism of 
mindfulness. Mindfulness’ non-judgmental acceptance and more concentrated attention on one’s 
problematic mindsets has resulted in some researchers proposing that mindfulness functions by 
increasing emotional acceptance and one’s willingness to experience discomforting emotions 
(Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004). Furthermore, this is thought to 
result in a lesser impact of and less time needed to recover from painful emotions and 
discomforting mental events (Kabat-Zinn, 1990).  
Mindfulness has also been likened to concepts in the social psychological literature. For 
example, mindfulness has been compared to decentering, a process which allows the individual 
to disengage or step outside their immediate experience in order to simply observe, and this is 
thought to put a “space between one’s perception and response” (Vago & Silbersweig, 2012). 
This can also allow an individual to become aware of the difference between one’s thoughts as 
they are, as opposed to when they are associated to the self (e.g. “I’m stupid” vs. “I am having 
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thoughts about being stupid”). Furthermore, mindfulness can also provide the awareness that an 
individual’s cognitions and feelings “are subjective and transient in nature” (Vago & 
Silbersweig, 2012; Safran, Segal, Hill, & Whiffen, 1990). All of these insights are thought to 
naturally give rise to a progressive non-attachment which helps improve one’s overall health, life 
satisfaction, and social relations (Sahdra, Shaver, & Brown, 2010). Mindfulness has also been 
likened to meta-awareness and metacognition, two synonymous concepts which refer to humans’ 
innate ability to be aware of their own cognitions. Meta-awareness and metacognition are akin to 
mindfulness in that they enable monitoring of consciousness for effective avoidance of 
unproductive thought patterns (e.g. negative reactions or rumination; Vago & Silbersweig, 
2012).  
II. Overview of Studies 
Given that research has shown self-distancing and mindfulness to reduce anxious distress and 
improve mood, both of which are associated with approach motivation, the main purpose of the 
following two studies is to assess whether brief self-distancing and mindfulness manipulations 
will also increase state approach motivated goal pursuit.  
Therefore, we hypothesized that self-distancing and mindfulness would increase approach 
motivated goal pursuit. Given that a variety of self-distancing and mindfulness treatments have 
been shown to reduce short-term and long-term anxious distress, we also hypothesized that self-
distancing and mindfulness would reduce state anxiety. Lastly, mindfulness and self-distancing 
have been shown to be particularly effective at reducing negative symptoms among anxious 
populations (Baer, 2003; Kross & Ayduk, 2011). Therefore, we also predicted that the effects 
predicted above would be particularly pronounced among high trait anxiety participants.  
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Study 1 
In study 1, we specifically tested four hypotheses. Because all participants were subjected to a 
relationship uncertainty threat, we firstly hypothesized that all participants (i.e. low and high trait 
anxious participants) would be able take advantage of self-distancing (vs. relaxation) to reduce 
state anxiety. Secondly, we hypothesized that self-distancing would reduce state anxiety even 
more effectively among high trait anxiety participants. Similarly, the third and fourth hypotheses 
suggest that in the presence of threat, self-distancing would increase approach motivated goal 
pursuit among participants in general, and even more effectively among high trait anxiety 
participants.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. One-hundred and forty-eight undergraduate psychology 
students (107 females, 40 males, 1 other; mean age = 20 years) participated over the URPP 
system for partial course credit between November 16 2012 and December 21 2012. The study 
was completed online, and was available to students through computers and mobile devices.  
Trait anxiety measures. Multiple measures related to anxiety and depression were 
measured. These included the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; 
Radloff, 1977), the Uncertainty Response Scale (specifically the emotional uncertainty subscale; 
Greco & Roger, 2001), the Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983), the 
Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (specifically the rumination subscale; Trapnell & 
Campbell, 1999), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), the Experiences in Close 
Relationships (ECR)-Anxiety subscale (Fraley, Waller & Brennan, 2000), the Philadelphia 
13 
 
Mindfulness Scale (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra & Farrow, 2008), the adult hope scale 
(Snyder et al., 1991), and the general self-efficacy scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995).  
Later analyses revealed that many of these personality measures were similarly moderating the 
relationship between the self-distancing condition and the dependent variables. Therefore, 
principal components analysis was used to identify an overall trait anxiety factor. Participants’ 
mean scores for those measures which loaded most strongly onto the trait anxiety factor (see 
Table 1) were standardized, and an overall mean score was created for each participant. Lastly, it 
is important to note that the trait anxiety measures were measured after the self-distancing (vs. 
control) manipulation. However, t-test analyses demonstrated that the personality measures were 
not significantly affected by the self-distancing manipulation, and the trait anxiety standardized 
mean was therefore used as a moderating variable. 
Uncertainty threat. All participants were subjected to an uncertainty threat in the 
context of an important relationship. Specifically, participants were asked to “please describe, as 
specifically as you can, a relationship with a friend, partner, or family member in which things 
seem to be going poorly and the future of the relationship feels uncertain.” Subsequently, 
participants were asked to “please describe the emotions that thinking about this uncertain 
relationship arouses in you.” Participants were given two minutes to answer each of these 
questions. Relationship threats are thought to be salient for most individuals, and such threats 
have been shown to effectively result in anxious distress (McGregor & Marigold, 2003).  
Self-distancing manipulation. After experiencing the uncertainty threat, participants 
were randomly assigned to either a self-distancing or relaxation (control) condition. Participants 
in the former condition were asked to perceive the uncertainty threat they previously experienced 
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from a self-distanced perspective (i.e. from the perspective of a fly on the wall; Kross & Ayduk, 
2011). Specifically, participants were asked that “regarding the uncertain relationship you just 
wrote about, imagine viewing yourself in the context of this relationship from the perspective of 
a fly on the wall--that is, an observer’s perspective from which you can see yourself, other 
relevant people, and the surroundings all at once. In the space below, please describe how the 
interactions and feelings in your uncertain relationship might seem from such a third person 
perspective.” Participants were given three minutes to complete this task. 
Participants in the relaxation condition were asked to choose an area of their life that they 
associated with relaxation, and were then asked to write about it. Specifically, participants were 
asked to “select the domain from the list in which you are most relaxed, and in the box below 
describe why being relaxed is important to you, and how you’ve been relaxed in this domain in 
the past and plan to in the future.” Participants were given the following domains to choose 
from: Business/Economics/Making Money, Social Life/Relationships, Art/Music/Theatre, Social 
Action/Helping Others, Science/Pursuit of Knowledge, and Religion/Spirituality. Participants 
were given three minutes to complete this task. Prior studies in the McGregor Lab (2012, 2013) 
demonstrated that the relaxation condition worked effectively as a control for manipulations such 
as value affirmation and spiritual affirmation. 
State approach motivated goal pursuit. Approach motivated goal pursuit was measured 
using the Behavioural Activation System (BAS) questionnaire (Carver & White, 1994). The 
BAS questionnaire is made of three subscales: 1) drive, which measures individual differences in 
the persistent pursuit of desired goals (e.g. “I would go out of my way to get what I wanted.”); 2) 
reward responsiveness, which measures individual differences in positive responses to present or 
anticipated reward (e.g. “It would excite me to win a contest”); 3) fun seeking, which measures 
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individual differences in desire for new rewards and one’s willingness to approach potentially 
new rewards on the spur of the moment (e.g. “I crave excitement and new sensations”).  Because 
of this study’s interest in the goal pursuit aspect of approach motivation, only the drive subscale 
(α=.76; Carver & White, 1994) was taken into consideration (see McGregor, Nash, & Prentice, 
2010 for another example of the BAS drive subscale being used on its own.)   
Furthermore, although the BAS questionnaire measures trait BAS, the present study modified it 
to measure state BAS. Specifically, the BAS questionnaire was introduced by asking the 
participants to “please rate the extent to which each of the following statements applies to you 
right now.” This was followed by the items as they appear on the original BAS questionnaire. 
Participants rated their agreement on each item from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. 
According to Carver and White (1994), the BAS questionnaire has reasonable reliability and 
validity, and it is related to other measures similar to the BAS (Harmon-Jones, & Allen, 1997; 
Sutton & Davidson, 1997).  
 State anxiety and negative affect measures. The felt uncertainty scale was used to 
measure state anxiety levels. It contains 19 items that measure conflict-related discomfort 
(McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2013). Participants were asked to “please take a few seconds to 
check in with your gut feeling and rate the following statements based on your first reaction. Do 
not over think it—just rely on your intuitive sense for how you are feeling at the moment.” 
Statements included “I feel mixed,” “I feel uneasy,” “I feel unclear,” “I feel of two minds,” etc. 
(α=.89; McGregor et al., 2013). McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, and Spencer (2001) and McGregor 
et al. (2013) have previously shown that an uncertainty threat similar to the one above 
significantly increased felt uncertainty scores. It has also been recently linked to anxiety-specific 
affect (Hayes, Ward, & McGregor, in press). The Negative Affect Scale of the PANAS (α=.75; 
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Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was used to complement the felt uncertainty scale as a 
measure of generalized negative affect, and used identical instructions. Statements included “I 
feel irritable,” “I feel ashamed,” “I feel nervous,” and “I feel afraid.” 
Results 
Preliminary analyses. Participants completed a number of personality measures. 
Participants’ mean scores on these measures were entered into a principal-components analysis, 
and two factors emerged (see Table 1). The first factor was interpreted as representing trait 
anxiety. The measures which loaded most strongly onto the trait anxiety factor were the CES-
Depression, the perceived stress scale, the uncertainty aversion scale, the Rosenberg self-esteem 
scale (reversed), the ECR anxiety subscale, and the rumination scale. Participants’ mean scores 
for these measures were standardized, and an overall mean score was created for each 
participant. Measures which loaded more strongly onto the second factor were not considered to 
represent trait anxiety and were not included in the overall mean score. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Felt uncertainty and PANAS negative affect were individually 
regressed on trait anxiety, self-distancing condition (self-distancing vs. control), and the trait 
anxiety X self-distancing condition interaction. Following the West and Aiken (1996) guidelines 
for analyzing experimental personality designs involving interactions between categorical and 
continuous variables, the self-distancing condition was effect coded, and the distribution of trait 
anxiety needed to be centered to make the mean equal to zero. There was no need to do the latter 
because the trait anxiety scores were already standardized. Furthermore, following West and 
Aiken (1996), the first order and interaction terms were entered into the regression 
simultaneously. These same steps were applied to all subsequent regression analyses. Results 
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revealed no main effect of self-distancing condition on either felt uncertainty (β = .02, t(144) = 
.36, p = .72) or negative affect (β = .07, t(144) = 1.03, p = .30). This result did not support the 
first hypothesis in study 1. In the presence of threat, self-distancing did not cause a significant 
decrease in state anxiety among participants.  
Furthermore, results did not reveal a significant effect self-distancing condition X trait anxiety 
interaction on felt uncertainty (β = .01, t(144) = .08, p = .94) or negative affect (β = .06, t(144) = 
.71, p = .48). This result did not support the second hypothesis in study 1. In the presence of 
threat, self-distancing did not cause a significant decrease in state anxiety among high trait 
anxious participants.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4. BAS drive was regressed on trait anxiety, self-distancing condition 
(self-distancing vs. control), and the trait anxiety X self-distancing condition interaction. Results 
did not reveal a main effect of self-distancing condition on BAS drive, β = -.11, t(144) = -1.32, p 
= .19. This result did not support the third hypothesis in study 1. In the presence of threat, self-
distancing did not cause a significant increase in BAS drive.  
However, results revealed a significant self-distancing condition X trait anxiety interaction effect 
on BAS drive, β = -.24, t(144) = -2.12, p = .04. Simple effects analysis revealed a significant 
simple effect for manipulated self-distancing at high trait anxiety, β = -.27, t(144) = -2.53, p = 
.01. As shown in Figure 1, at one standard deviation above the mean in trait anxiety, BAS drive 
was significantly higher in the self-distancing condition than in the relaxation (control) 
condition. This result supported the fourth hypothesis in study 2. In the presence of threat, self-
distancing caused a significant increase in BAS drive among high trait anxious participants. 
Study 2 
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Given that the relationship uncertainty threat did not work as expected in study 1, it was not 
included in study 2. Because of the lack of threat, we did not expect low trait anxiety participants 
to respond similarly to high trait anxiety participants when subjected to the mindfulness 
manipulation.  
Study 2 was designed to investigate how a mindfulness manipulation would affect state anxiety 
and approach motivated goal pursuit among high anxiety (vs. low anxiety) participants. Firstly, 
we hypothesized that mindfulness would reduce state anxiety among high trait anxiety 
participants. Secondly, we hypothesized that mindfulness would increase approach motivated 
goal pursuit among high trait anxiety participants.  
In addition, although there is an abundance of mindfulness based studies, few experimental 
studies have presented adequate control conditions for their mindfulness conditions. Therefore, a 
secondary goal of study 2 was to present an adequate control condition for the mindfulness 
manipulation. The control condition in study 2 was designed to exactly mirror the wording of the 
mindfulness manipulation, aside from the key active ingredients in the mindfulness 
manipulation.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. One-hundred and forty-three undergraduate psychology 
students (106 females, 37 males; mean age = 20 years) participated over the URPP system for 
partial course credit between September 28 2013 and October 25 2013. The study was completed 
online, and was available to students through computers and mobile devices. 
Trait anxiety measures. Similarly to study 1, multiple measures related to anxiety and 
depression were measured. These measures included the perceived stress scale (Cohen et al., 
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1983), the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965), the CES-depression (Radloff, 1977), 
the uncertainty response scale-emotional uncertainty subscale (Greco & Roger, 2001), the 
rumination questionnaire (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), the regulatory focus pride questionnaire 
(Higgins et al., 2001), the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Lockwood, Jordan & Kunda, 2002), 
the general self-control scale (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), the general self-efficacy 
scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995), the mindful awareness attention scale (MAAS; Brown & 
Ryan, 2003), the Behavioural Inhibition System/Behavioural Activation System (BIS/BAS) 
questionnaire (Carver & White, 1994), the adult hope trait scale (Snyder et al., 1991), and the 
perceived need for structure scale (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).  
Similarly to study 1, later analyses revealed that many of these personality measures were 
similarly moderating the relationship between the mindfulness condition and the dependent 
variables. Therefore, principal components analysis was once again used to identify an overall 
trait anxiety factor. Again, participants’ mean scores for those variables which loaded most 
strongly onto the trait anxiety factor were standardized, and an overall mean score was created 
for each participant. 
Lastly, unlike in study 1, the trait anxiety related variables were measured before the 
manipulation. 
Mindfulness manipulation. After completing the trait anxiety related measures, 
participants were randomly assigned to either a mindfulness or free thought (control) condition. 
Both the mindfulness and free thought conditions were introduced with the following statement: 
“People process their thoughts and feelings in different ways. This task investigates ways people 
notice and then process the thoughts and feelings that come across their minds.”  
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Subsequently, participants specifically in the mindfulness condition were asked to “write any 
thoughts that come to your mind just as they are. In other words, try to observe your thoughts 
nonjudgmentally as you write them down. We would appreciate it if you tried to do this as best 
you can.” Participants were required to spend at least two minutes on this task. Alternatively, 
participants in the free thought (control) condition were asked to “write any thoughts that come 
to your mind. We would appreciate it if you tried to do this as best you can.” Again, participants 
were required to spend at least two minutes on this task.   
State approach motivated goal pursuit. As in study one, the BAS questionnaire drive 
subscale (Carver & White, 1994) was slightly modified to measure state (rather than trait) 
approach motivation. 
State anxiety and negative affect measures.  Similarly to study 1, the felt uncertainty 
scale and the PANAS negative affect subscale were used.  
Results 
 Preliminary analyses. As in study 1, participants completed a number of personality 
measures. Participants’ mean scores for these measures were entered into a principal-components 
analysis, and three factors emerged (refer to table 2). The first factor was interpreted as 
representing trait anxiety. The measures which loaded most strongly onto the trait anxiety factor 
were the perceived stress scale, the Rosenberg self-esteem scale, the CES-Depression scale, the 
uncertainty response-emotional uncertainty subscale, the rumination scale, the regulatory focus 
pride questionnaire, the regulatory focus questionnaire prevention subscale, the general self-
control scale, the general self-efficacy scale, the adult trait hope scale, the trait BIS scale, and the 
MAAS. As in study 1, participants’ mean scores for these measures were standardized, and an 
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overall mean score was created for each participant. Measures which loaded more strongly onto 
any of the other factors were not considered to represent trait anxiety and were not included in 
the overall mean score for trait anxiety. 
Hypothesis 1. Felt uncertainty and PANAS negative affect subscale were individually 
regressed on trait anxiety, mindfulness condition (mindfulness vs. control), and the trait anxiety 
X mindfulness condition interaction. Following the West and Aiken (1996) guidelines for 
analyzing experimental personality designs involving interactions between categorical and 
continuous variables, the mindfulness condition was effect coded, and the distribution of trait 
anxiety needed to be centered to make the mean equal to zero. There was no need to do the latter 
because the trait anxiety scores were already standardized. Furthermore, following West and 
Aiken (1996), the first order and interaction terms were entered into the regression 
simultaneously. These same steps were applied to all subsequent regression analyses. 
Results did not reveal a significant effect of mindfulness condition X trait anxiety interaction on 
felt uncertainty (β = .08, t(137) = .84, p = .40) or on negative affect (β = .08, t(137) = .76, p = 
.45). These results did not support the first hypothesis of study 2. Mindfulness did not cause a 
significant decrease in state anxiety among high trait anxious participants.  
Hypothesis 2. BAS drive was regressed on trait anxiety, mindfulness condition 
(mindfulness vs. control), and the trait anxiety X mindfulness condition interaction. Results 
revealed a significant mindfulness X trait anxiety interaction, β = -.33, t(138) = -2.64, p = .01. 
This effect remained significant even when controlling for trait BAS drive (i.e. measured before 
the mindfulness manipulation; β = -.26, t(134) = -2.53, p = .01).  
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Simple effects analysis revealed a marginally significant simple effect for manipulated 
mindfulness at high trait anxiety, β = -.21, t (138) = -1.79, p = .08. As shown in Figure 2, at one 
standard deviation above the mean in trait anxiety, BAS drive was marginally significantly 
higher in the mindfulness condition than in the control condition. This result supported the 
second hypothesis in study 2. Mindfulness caused a marginally significant increase in BAS drive 
among high trait anxious participants.  
Simple effects analysis also revealed a significant simple effect for manipulated mindfulness at 
low trait anxiety, β = .25, t(138) = 1.98, p = .05. As show in Figure 2, at one standard deviation 
below the mean in trait anxiety, BAS drive was significantly lower in the mindfulness condition 
than in the control condition. This was an unexpected finding which is explored in the 
discussion. 
III. General Discussion 
Effect of Self-Distancing and Mindfulness on Approach Motivation 
High Trait Anxiety Participants 
Supporting hypothesis 4 in study 1 and hypothesis 2 in study 2, the self-distancing and 
mindfulness manipulations increased state BAS drive among trait anxious participants. This 
finding parallels prior studies demonstrating that mindfulness and self-distancing are positively 
associated with positive mood and reduced anxiety, which are also associated with approach 
motivation (Drake & Myers, 2006; Baer, 2003; Jimenez, Niles, & Park, 2010). Furthermore, the 
increase in BAS drive may indicate that mindfulness and self-distancing are capable of helping 
anxious participants focus on newer goals instead of engaging in anxious or ruminative thoughts.  
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However, increased BAS drive does not always refer to an increased pursuit of productive goals. 
It is possible that this increased approach motivation represents a maladaptive defensive response 
to threatening difficulties associated with attempting to follow the mindfulness and self-
distancing manipulations. The manipulations essentially asked participants to notice their 
thoughts, which might very likely be anxious thoughts, and high trait anxious participants 
without adequate training could conceivably find this aversive and threatening.  
As mentioned earlier, after experiencing threat, there is a tendency for people to react with 
approach motivation (referred to as reactive approach motivation or RAM). RAM’s 
characteristic ability to single-mindedly focus on a new goal can be very useful when it is 
necessary to move from conflicted to non-conflicted goals. However, because RAM has anxiety 
reducing qualities, humans and other animals may pursue a new goal solely for the sake of 
escaping anxious uncertainty. This can be problematic because the adopted goal need not be 
useful (for any other reason besides reducing anxiety), and can even be harmful. For example, 
humans can pursue goals that are ideologically extreme or aggressive in order to activate 
approach motivation and reduce anxiety. McGregor, Nash, Mann, & Phills (2010) have 
repeatedly observed that after being threatened and made anxious (e.g. using academic 
uncertainty and relationship uncertainty threats), many participants become ideologically 
extreme and simultaneously demonstrate approach motivation as measured behaviorally, on self-
report, implicitly, and by EEG (McGregor & Jordan, 2007; McGregor et al., 2009; McGregor, 
Nash, & Prentice, 2010; Nash et al., 2010). The RAM induced by threat is capable of being 
moderated and mediated by defensive idealism (McGregor, Nash, Mann, & Phills, 2010; 
McGregor, Nash, & Prentice, 2010). Therefore, there is experimental and neuroscience data 
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pointing to the role of defensive versions of RAM serving as palliative responses to anxious 
uncertainty.  
Furthermore, to explore the likelihood of this defensiveness explanation for the obtained increase 
in BAS drive, we investigated the moderating role of personality traits. The relationship between 
perceived threat and RAM has been shown to be moderated by a number of personality traits, 
one of which is self-esteem (McGregor, Nash & Inzlicht, 2009). High self-esteem individuals are 
generally more approach motivated, and increased RAM among high self-esteem individuals 
after threat can be a sign of resilience in the presence of conflict (Heimpel, Elliot, & Wood, 
2006). However, high self-esteem individuals are also more likely to engage in defensive forms 
of RAM, such as world-view defense and religious extremism (McGregor, Nash, & Inzlicht, 
2009).   
Therefore, additional analyses for studies one and two used a three-way interaction between self-
esteem, condition and trait anxiety (new trait anxiety score was created without self-esteem) as a 
diagnostic tool for evaluating whether the increase in BAS drive among high anxiety participants 
may have been a defensive form of RAM. For both study 1 (β = -.14, t(140) = -1.20, p = .23) and 
study 2 (β = .06, t(133) = .44, p = .66), this interaction proved non-significant. This may indicate 
that participants who are high self-esteem/high anxiety are not responding differently than low 
self-esteem/high anxiety participants, and that the increased BAS drive among high anxiety 
participants is not necessarily a defensive form of RAM. This may suggest that self-distancing 
and mindfulness are in fact helping high anxiety participants pursue non-defensive goals. 
Self-distancing and mindfulness may have enabled increased BAS drive by helping high anxiety 
participants temporarily change their relationship to anxiety. Kross and Ayduk (2008, 2009) have 
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demonstrated that self-distancing enables people to focus less on recounting their negative 
experiences, and more on reconstruing them such that they gain more closure and insight (Kross 
& Ayduk, 2011). Similarly, mindfulness’ non-judgmental and accepting awareness is thought to 
reduce the aversiveness of anxious thoughts and help the individual develop a less fearful and 
more curious approach to understanding personal anxieties (Kabat-Zinn, 1992, 1990). 
Approaching anxieties from a less threatened perspective may have allowed high anxiety 
participants to disengage from overactive BIS activity and defensive RAM, and to instead take a 
new approach with new goals. 
Low Trait Anxiety Participants 
Whereas high anxiety participants demonstrated significantly greater BAS drive after 
experiencing self-distancing or mindfulness, this was not the case for their low anxiety 
counterparts. In study 1, self-distancing (compared to control) did not affect BAS drive for low 
anxiety participants (refer to figure 1). This may have been because low anxiety participants 
were less receptive to the benefits of self-distancing for increasing BAS drive. 
However, it is also possible that high anxiety participants were experiencing more distress 
compared to low anxiety participants, especially after the relationship uncertainty threat. This 
may have resulted in high anxiety participants engaging in defensive RAM to reduce anxiety, 
while low anxiety participants were less in need of using RAM for palliative purposes. However, 
as mentioned earlier, the three-way interaction between self-esteem, condition and trait anxiety 
was non-significant in studies 1 and 2. Therefore, it is unlikely that low anxiety participants 
demonstrated less BAS drive simply due to lower levels of defensive RAM.  
26 
 
Furthermore, low trait anxiety participants who experienced mindfulness also behaved 
differently from their high anxiety counterparts and, surprisingly, demonstrated the opposite 
effect (refer to figure 2). Specifically, low trait anxiety participants demonstrated significantly 
less BAS drive after experiencing mindfulness.  
Past research has shown that different personality traits affect the type of meditation which is 
most effective for increasing approach motivation. For example, Barnhofer, Chittka, Nightingale, 
Visser, and Crane (2010) found that high brooding individuals demonstrated increased approach 
motivation after breathing meditation, but not after loving kindness meditation, and found the 
opposite trend among low brooding individuals. Self-distancing and mindfulness, although 
conceptually different, are similar practices which emphasize a clear awareness on one’s 
cognitions. It is possible that low trait anxiety individuals simply do not respond to either of 
these practices the way high anxiety individuals do.  
Effect of Self-Distancing and Mindfulness on State Anxiety 
Contradictory to hypotheses, neither the self-distancing nor the mindfulness manipulations were 
able to decrease state anxiety (i.e. felt uncertainty and negative affect). Furthermore, they were 
equally ineffective in reducing state anxiety for high trait anxious participants. This was 
surprising given that past studies have shown self-distancing and mindfulness to be effective in 
reducing short-term and long-term emotional reactivity, anxiety and negative affect (Kabat-Zinn, 
1992; Miller, Fletcher, & Kabat-Zinn, 1995; Ayduk & Kross, 2010).  
Mindfulness and State Anxiety 
The mindfulness manipulation in study two may not have worked as expected because it was 
unique and not necessarily reflective of how other studies have operationalized mindfulness (i.e. 
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with mindfulness based treatment programs and mindfulness audio guides). Therefore, the 
mindfulness manipulation may not have captured the concept as it is understood in the 
psychological literature, and may consequently not have led to the same reductions in anxiety 
and negative affect witnessed in other studies.  
Furthermore, one of the key elements of mindfulness practice is the development of insight into 
the nature our distress, such as an awareness of one’s harmful reactions to negative events or of 
the transient nature of one’s distress (Sauer & Baer, 2010). This insight can be recalled during 
distress to help the individual regulate their anxiety. It has been shown that such insight can be 
developed with mindfulness training, but it typically requires some time (Erisman & Roemer, 
2010; Feldman, Greeson, & Senville, 2010). Mindfulness based therapy programs have 
repeatedly been shown to result in lower levels of trait and state anxiety (Hofmann, Sawyer, 
Witt, & Oh, 2010). However, they typically last eight weeks and therefore afford far more time 
to practice mindfulness and to ultimately derive such useful bits of insight. On the other hand, 
the mindfulness manipulation in study 2 only lasted three minutes.  
Furthermore, mindfulness is thought to be useful for lowering rumination and anxiety because of 
its emphasis on non-judgmental awareness of the present moment, which is thought to help 
redirect one’s attention to present experiences rather than ruminative thought cycles. The 
mindfulness manipulation in study two differed, however, in that it made participants focus on 
their present cognitions rather than their present experiences overall. High anxiety participants 
may have inadvertently focused on cognitions related to past negative experiences or future 
fears, making them more distressed.  
Self-Distancing and State Anxiety  
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On the other hand, the self-distancing manipulation used in study one was very similar to that 
used by other researchers, and in the past has been shown capable of reducing anxiety, 
rumination, emotional and physical reactivity, both in the short term and long-term (Ayduk & 
Kross, 2008; Kross & Ayduk, 2008). Despite this, study one’s self-distancing manipulation was 
incapable of affecting state levels of anxiety. In past research, self-distancing has been found to 
be particularly effective for vulnerable populations, such as individuals struggling with moderate 
to severe levels of depression and rumination (Kross & Ayduk, 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, 
& Lyubomirsky, 2008). It is possible that the manipulation did not have much of an effect due to 
the generally sub-clinical levels of trait anxiety among participants. In future research, it would 
be interesting to explore if the self-distancing manipulation can be more effective in reducing 
state anxiety for a group of people with moderate to severe trait anxiety. 
Self-distancing may also have been ineffective at reducing state anxiety due to a control 
condition that specifically asked participants to relax. In previous self-distancing work, the 
control conditions have usually consisted of self-immersion or distraction (Kross & Ayduk, 
2008). Self-immersion has not been found to be useful for coping with anxiety, while distraction 
has been found to be useful for reducing short-term anxiety but not long-term anxiety (Kross & 
Ayduk, 2008). It is possible that our relaxation control acted like Kross & Ayduk’s (2008) 
distraction manipulation, proving to be just as effective as self-distancing in the short-term, but 
potentially not so in the long-term. On the other hand, although self-distancing did significantly 
boost approach motivation for anxious people, these results could indicate that past self-
distancing manipulations may do no better at reducing state anxiety than simple instructions to 
relax. 
Limitations 
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The studies had two major limitations. Firstly, the state measure of BAS drive was created by 
modifying the question stem of the original BAS scale (refer to Methods section above; Carver 
& White, 1994). This may have been a problem because the BAS scale was originally created to 
measure trait BAS, and the reliability of our modified version was not measured or tested. 
Second, our operationalization of trait anxiety (calculation demonstrated in the preliminary 
analyses of the Methods section) included numerous variables which are not explicitly related to 
anxiety (e.g. hope, self-efficacy, etc.) Therefore, although the benefit of this construct lay in its 
open-ended and more inclusive nature, the studies may also have benefited from a trait anxiety 
measure composed of only the more obvious measures of trait anxiety (e.g. uncertainty aversion, 
perceived psychological stress, rumination, etc.) 
IV. Future Research 
One of the key elements of mindfulness practice seems to be the development of insight 
regarding the nature of one’s distress, and this type of knowledge takes time to develop (Sauer & 
Baer, 2010). It is possible that our mindfulness manipulation did not affect state anxiety because 
participants did not have a chance to repeatedly practice. It would be interesting if future 
research could investigate the effects of our mindfulness manipulation over the long-term (e.g. 
practicing twice a day for ten minutes over 4 weeks). If a more long-term application of our 
mindfulness manipulation helps decrease anxiety, it could provide a very brief and practical 
means of practicing mindfulness.    
As mentioned earlier, part of mindfulness’ effectiveness is thought to come from its emphasis on 
an awareness of the present moment, which is thought to help redirect one’s attention to present 
experiences rather than ruminative though cycles (Jain et al., 2007, Davidson et al., 2003). 
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However, our mindfulness manipulation asked participants to focus on their present cognitions 
rather than present experiences overall. It is possible that this backfired for high anxiety 
participants and made them focus on cognitions related to past negative experiences or future 
fears, making them more distressed. It would be interesting to see if asking high anxiety 
participants to engage in a more general awareness (rather than being focused solely on their 
cognitions) might be more effective for reducing anxious distress. For example, rather than 
asking participants to “write any thoughts that come to your mind just as they are…”, 
participants could be asked to “write any thoughts, emotions or sensations that come to your 
mind just as they are…”.  
Although our self-distancing manipulation did not reduce state anxiety, this may have been due 
to the relaxation condition working just as effectively. Kross and Ayduk (2008) demonstrated 
that self-distancing and distraction were equally effective at reducing distress in the short-term. 
However self-distancing maintained its anxiety reducing qualities in the long-term as well. 
Therefore, future studies might want to compare self-distancing to relaxation in the long-term. It 
is possible that the benefits of self-distancing (compared to relaxation) will only be noticeable a 
few months down the line. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Table 1. Principal Components Analysis of Personality Measure Means for Study 1 (N=148).   
Personality Variables Loading on Each Factor 
 Trait Anxiety Factor 2 
Depression .828 .127 
Self-Esteem -.772 .174 
Perceived Stress .754 .177 
Uncertainty Response .746 .265 
ECR-Anxiety .685 .308 
Self-Efficacy -.626 .596 
Hope -.615 .594 
Rumination .597 .488 
Mindfulness-Awareness -.221 .782 
  Mindfulness-Acceptance -.405 -.683 
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Table 2. Principal Components Analysis of Personality Measure Means for Study 2 (N=143).  
Personality Variables Loading on Each Factor 
 Trait Anxiety Factor 2 Factor 3 
Perceived Stress .827   
Self-Esteem -.771 .223 .150 
Depression .766 .137 -.148 
Uncertainty Response .766 .250 .227 
Rumination .670 .270 .114 
Pride -.659 .350 .149 
Prevention .622 .422  
Self-Control -.606  .492 
Self-Efficacy -.604 .457 -.107 
Hope -.602 .596  
BIS .591 .348 .381 
MAAS -.567 -.202 .351 
BAS-Reward  .758  
Promotion -.163 .709 .230 
BAS-Drive -.203 .624 -.309 
BAS-Fun  .455 -.704 
PNS .317 .202 .673 
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Figure 1. BAS drive measure as a function of trait anxiety and self-distancing condition in study 1. 
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Figure 2. BAS drive measure as a function of trait anxiety and mindfulness condition in study 2. 
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Figure 3. Order of Materials for Study 1. 
1. Consent form 
2. URPP number, age, gender 
3. Experiences in close relationships scale-anxiety subscale (Fraley, Waller & Brennan, 
2000) 
4. Self-distancing condition vs. relaxation condition (random assignment) 
5. Behavioural activation system scale (BAS; Carver & White, 1994) 
6. PANAS-negative affect subscale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
7. Felt uncertainty scale (McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2013) 
8. Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) 
9. Center for epidemiological studies depression scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) 
10. Uncertainty response scale-emotional uncertainty subscale (Greco & Roger, 2001) 
11. Philadelphia mindfulness scale (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008) 
12. Adult hope scale (Synder et al., 1991) 
13. General self-efficacy scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) 
14. Perceived stress scale (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983) 
15. Rumination reflection questionnaire-rumination subscale (Trapnell & Campell, 1999) 
16. Compliance check 
17. Debriefing 
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Figure 4. Order of Materials for Study 2. 
1. Consent 
2. URPP, age and gender 
3. BAS scale (Carver & White, 1994) 
4. Mindful awareness attention scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003) 
5. Adult hope trait scale (Snyder et al., 1991) 
6. General self-efficacy scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) 
7. Perceived stress scale (Cohen et al., 1983) 
8. Rumination reflection questionnaire-rumination subscale (Trapnell & Campell, 1999) 
9. Perceived need for structure scale (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) 
10. Regulatory focus questionnaire (Lockwood, Jordan & Kunda, 2002) 
11. Regulatory focus pride questionnaire (Higgins et al., 2001) 
12. Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) 
13. General self-control scale (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004)  
14. CES-D scale (Radloff, 1977)  
15. Uncertainty response scale-emotional uncertainty subscale (Greco & Roger, 2001) 
16. Mindfulness condition vs. control condition (random but even assignment) 
17. State BAS scale (modified from Carver & White, 1994)  
18. PANAS- negative affect subscale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
19. Felt uncertainty scale (McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2013) 
20. Manipulation checks 
21. Compliance check 
22. Debrief 
 
 
 
 
